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Abbreviations
CCRI: Comite Clandestino Revolucionario Indigena (Indigenous Revolutionary Clandestine
Committee).
COCOPA: Comision por la Concordia y Pacificacion (Committee for the concordance and
pacification).
EZLN: Ejercito Popular Revolucionario (Revolutionary Popular Army).
FLN: Fuerzas de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Forces).
FZLN: Frente Zapatista de Liberacion nacional (Zapatista Front for National Liberation).
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement.
PAN: Partido Accion Nacional (National Action Party).
PRD: Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (Party of the Democratic Revolution).
PRl: Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party).
PRONASOL: Programa nacional de Solidaridad (National Solidarity Program).
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Introduction
On August 14**’ 2001 The Mexican Congress reformed Article two of the Mexican
Constitution. It begins:

“The nation has a multicultural composition, originating in its indigenous people, who are
descended from people who lived in the current territory of the country, who live in it
now, and who keep their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions or parts
of these.
This constitutional amendment on indigenous rights came after a long and difficult struggle and
was the product of recent political upheaval and change. The year 1994 saw a rebellion in
Mexico’s southernmost state of Chiapas that aimed to correct Mexico’s corrupt one-party
political system. The movers behind the rebellion were indigenous communities. This rebellion
had a profound effect on Mexican politics and the struggle for indigenous rights including the
right to autonomy. This thesis will analyze the rebellion’s effects on Mexico to assess whether,
overall, it was a success or failure with regards to autonomy for indigenous peoples in Mexico.
Many of those directly involved in the conflict see the constitutional amendment still as a failure.
They believe that the rights afforded in the constitution are “shackled with limits and conditions
,2

which invalidate their very existence.’
The Chiapas rebellion offers a promising window into questions of indigenous autonomy
more broadly. Autonomy is a device to allow ethnic or other groups claiming a distinct identity
to exercise direct control over affairs of special concern to them, while allowing the larger entity
those powers which cover common interests.'^ There is no one correct form of autonomy for all
groups and its success is based on a balance between the common and the particular interests.
' The Constitution of Mexico.
’ Jesus Ramirez Cuevas. Indigenous Rights: Why are the Reforms Being Rejected? La Jornada. May 1.^'*’ 2001.
'Yash Ghai. Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States. Pg. 8
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That balance is different in every country due to its unique history, political processes, cultural
differences, and economic disparities. It has become a popular tool to reconcile differences
between ethnically different groups by accommodating a political reorganization of space.'^
Indigenous groups in particular have attempted to use autonomy to settle their political disputes.
Due to their common history of being disenfranchised, a regional concentration, and the ability
of autonomy to protect and promote the culture of a community, autonomy is increasingly
viewed as the most appropriate and sustainable method to mitigate ethnic conflict.^
Mexico is a nation of contradictions. In Mexico City there is ample evidence to suggest
that Mexico has arrived to and participates in the First World, or rich, market economy based
countries. In Chiapas it is the opposite as the conditions and the people give the impression of
the Third World and leave no room to think otherwise. These disparities are what make Mexico
such an interesting place full of unique social, political, and cultural relationships. The Chiapas
Rebellion is a conflict which rose in direct opposition to these relationships and the inequalities
in them. Its mission, the destruction of the national government, was never realized as they had
intended, but the reverberations of its impact as a group and political force are seen today
throughout Mexico and Chiapas.
The resolution of conflict between ethnic groups of different social and economic
stratification is one of the most difficult tasks a nation faces today. There is a tension between
attempting to maintain a nation’s sovereignty and diverse community and securing the well
being and civil liberties of all its members. In the resolution of any struggle, especially those of
a political nature, the most important element is cooperation and the degree to which each party
pursues it. The amount to which it is pursued is dependent on the amount of power each group
^ Yash Ghai. Autonomy and Ethnicity. Pg. I
^ Yash Ghai. Autonomy and Ethnicity. Pg. 7 and pg. 24.
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holds over the other group. In its broadest terms the struggle for autonomy is based on the
inherent power of a group of people and how they can use it to put pressure on an opposing
group. As we will see power is made up of many parts, can be taken away, gained, or lost, and is
the justification for all types of action from violence to marginalization and neglect.
The constitutional reforms regarding the rights of indigenous peoples are subject to many
shortcomings which are the result of specific political agenda in the Mexican National
Government. The origins of these motivations and of the motivations of those struggling for
autonomy have been shaped by hundreds of years of struggle between the National Government
and indigenous peoples. The historical roots of the rebellion aid in illuminating the course of
action each actor took and reveal the complexities of each of their policies toward the other.
Before any discussion on autonomy or the rebellion it is essential that the reader
understands the indigenous element in this case study on autonomy. The first chapter focuses on
the identity of the indigenous people in Chiapas. The chapter is divided into three parts, each of
which is a key element of how the indigenous population came to take the forms it did at the
time of the rebellion in 1994. The first segment deals with the long history of institutionalized
oppression of the indigenous people of Mexico from the time of Spanish conquest until the
Mexican revolution in 1917. Following the revolution, although institutionalized oppression
formally came to a close, they continually found themselves, as a group, marginalized and
discriminated against. These forces of marginalization and discrimination had profound effects
on both the group dynamics of the indigenous communities as well as their social and economic
wellbeing. The second segment of the chapter will explore these forces of marginalization and
show how they created stnjcturally new types of communities and how the structure relates to
the rebellion. The third segment of the chapter covers the overall economic conditions of the
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indigenous people. In particular, the section on poverty explores the state’s role in both creating
this situation and its attempts to alleviate it. The state’s role in the situation in Chiapas had a
large effect on the creation of the EZLN. The dynamics of the beginning of the EZLN and the
role the communities and Marcos took in its formation are explored here and provide a
background for the day of rebellion on January 1, 1994.
The second chapter of the thesis is the case study of the Chiapas rebellion and the
subsequent struggle for autonomy. The Declarations of the EZLN serve as a guide to trace the
progress of the rebellion and to illustrate the turns it took over time. The history of the struggle
is important to indicate the true objectives of each group and how these motivations originated.
The Chapter begins just prior to the rebellion on a date in 1992 when thousands of Indigenous
people marched on San Cristobal to protest 500 years of oppression. The march would serve as a
trial run for the rebellion itself The objectives of the EZLN appear within the Declarations
released periodically throughout the rebellion. The objectives stated in the Declarations have
fluctuated among various goals ranging from indigenous rights to the overthrowing of the
national government. These changes are among the unique difficulties in the struggle for
autonomy in Mexico.
The third and final chapter of the thesis looks at the Chiapas rebellion in an analytical
rather than narrative manner. The main purpose is to explore the decision making processes of
the actors, the EZLN and the National Government to show that autonomy is a dynamic process
rather than a concrete result. The struggle for indigenous autonomy is viewed as a negotiation
between a dominant group, in this case the National Government of Mexico, and a subordinate
group represented by the EZLN. Their respective positions of power or subordination grossly
affect the actions of a group even in the cases where they are working towards a similar goal
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such as autonomy. This approach helps us understand the difficulties in reaching an agreement
between the EZLN and the Government and explains the reasoning behind their respective
actions.
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Chapter 1: The Indigenous in Chiapas
The identity of the indigenous people in Chiapas, Mexico is rooted in a history of
oppression from Columbus through the post World War II boom up to the present day. Their
identity is closely tied to their community and the changes that occurred in them. These
communities are the location of some of the most extreme poverty in this hemisphere. The
National Commission for the Development of the Indigenous Peoples (Comision Nacional para
el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas CDI)counts 6 million indigenous peoples in Mexico and
distinguishes 62 indigenous groups by their use of a unique language.^ The government’s
chosen method to distinguish the different indigenous groups lacks the ability to classify the
multi-ethnic, multi-cultural indigenous communities which arose in the Lacandon Jungle in the
1930s. These groups were formed out of common experiences and a common situation rather
than a common language. The differences between these communities and the older indigenous
communities are the roots of the struggle for autonomy.

Long History of Oppression
The indigenous people of Chiapas have a long and horrific history of subjugation and
discrimination. Even in pre-colonial times there was little peace between the various indigenous
groups and wars were constantly fought.^ The arrival of the Spanish and the effects of the
subsequent subjugation of the indigenous people are still present in Mexico to this day. The
main purpose for the oppression was institutionalized, unhindered use of the indigenous people
th

for manual labor. Amazingly, due to the work of Bartolome de Las Casas in the mid 16

Comision nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indigenas. http;//www.cdi.gob.mx/indcx.php?id, scccion=.^
^ Jorge Larrain. Identity and Modernity in Latin America. Polity Press: Cambridge. 2000. Pg. 44
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century, this practice of forced labor was forbidden in Mexico by the Spanish crown.^ The laws
had little effect on the practice, however. Independence from Spain brought little change to the
situation of indigenous workers as the Ladinos or people of mixed Spanish and Indian decent
were just as cruel and domineering as the previous Spanish rulers. During the nearly 400 years
between the arrival of the Spanish and the reforms following the Mexican revolution (most
notably the refonus by Cardenas in the 1930s) the Indians were forced to work, either as slaves
during the time of the Spanish or as annually recontracted debt peonage imder the ladinos.^ The
debt peonage created a system oide facto slavery for the indigenous involved because they were
under control of the holder of their debts which quickly became impossible to pay off.
The institutional systems of oppression had a profound impact on the indigenous way of
life and the structures of the communities they formed. As late as the 1940s the local customs of
many indigenous communities remained virtually unchanged since colonial times. They
operated in a closed community separated from outside people and based largely on a communal
system in which the people who did the most for the community were respected the most. This
horizontal rather than vertical hierarchy was a staple of the Indigenous community. During the
1950s, however, the government began to take a more proactive role in the lives of the
indigenous people attempting to assimilate certain aspects of their culture into the dominant
western model. This assimilation was primarily meant, on a national level, to alleviate poverty
in Chiapas, but the intense corruption of the local leaders only caused the majority of programs
to reinforce PRI control. In 1951, the Institiito Nacional Indigenista (INI) was formed with the
mission of regional development through public schools, cooperatives, medical services, and
legal aid. The Ladinos of San Cristobal eventually took control of many parts of the program
John Womack Jr. Rebellion in Chiapas: An historical reader. The New Press: New York. 1999. Pg. 63-64
^ John Womack Jr. Rebellion in Chiapas: an historical reader. Pg. 3-6
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installing within the previously separate communities a person of authority disrupting the entire
system of communal power sharing. The bilingual teachers sent to the communities by the
10

ladino run INI became the primary leaders in a majority of these communities.
The marginalized nature of the majority oflow skilled workers in Mexico led to their
increased marginalization as the national government repeatedly made decisions that affected the
employment and viability of them as a group in order to cater to the rich land owners. By the
mid 1970s there were as many as 75,000 indigenous people working in migratory agricultural
labor. By the early 1990s that number was down to about 40,000 despite the increase in the size
II

of the indigenous population from 150,000 to 320,000.

The destruction of the main source of

income for the majority of indigenous people, agricultural production, led to increased migration
and attempts to find and settle new ejidos.
The PRl ruled Mexico for over seventy years primarily due to the party leadership’s
ability to levy certain political benefits and offer conditional rewards that ensured broad political
support. More often than not these political benefits often came at the expense of the indigenous
communities. This political oppression in the 1970s and 80s manifested itself in the canyons of
the “Lacandon Community” in a struggle known as “La Brecha”(The Breach). Just as the
communities in the Lacandon began to increase in both size and number the Mexican President
Luis Echeverria decreed that 2,400 square miles of the of the Lacandon (roughly half) belonged
to “the Lacandon Tribe” for the sole purpose of rain forest garden fanning. The real purpose,
however, was the mahogany and cedar cutting that took place earning a fortune for all involved
PRl politicians. Many of the communities chose not to relocate and the conflict, El Ccmjlicto par

Womack. Pg 13
Nicholas P Higgins. Understanding the Chiapas Rebellion. University of Texas Press; Austin. 2004 Pg. 130
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La Brecha^ would last 16 years all the while representing the extent of the PRIs institutionalized
12

marginalization of the Indigenous communities in Chiapas.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s Mexico moved further and further away from
institutionalized marginalization of indigenous people to satisfy the PRI’s increased desire for
recognition on an international scale. Due to several international circumstances the oppression
and hardship for the indigenous people only worsened. Under the reforms of Salinas, which
mainly included trade liberalization and industrialization, Chiapas, which is relies on agriculture,
underwent a deep depression. These modernization efforts helped Mexico as a whole but crises
in the oil industry and the Mexico City earthquake hurt the economy as a whole. The
agricultural sector was the hardest hit and in the midst of this impoverishment of Chiapas the
Congress of Mexico passed an article on agrarian reform effectively ending their responsibility
to grant land to the landless. Despite obvious reasons for the reform, such as the lack of
availability of land to disperse, the message the indigenous peoples received by its passing

was

13

that the Government was washing their hands of the poorest of the poor.

Ethnic Diversity and Indian Communities
Within the state of Chiapas there are 12 Indigenous groups: Tseltal, Tsotsil, Ch ol,
Tojol-ab'al, Zoque, Chuj, Kanjobal, Mam,Jacalteco, Mocho, Cakchiquel and Lacandon, each
located in a distinct geographical region. The Rebellion consisted of indigenous from several
groups with a majority coming from the largest groups located in the highlands, the Tseltal,
Tsotsil, and Ch’ol. These individual groups were able to form a single organization capable of a

Womack. Pg. 20: Nicholas P. Higgins. Pg. 148.
"Womack. Pg. 21; Monica Serrano and Victor Bulmcr-Thomas. Rebuilding the State: Mexico Atter Salinas.
Institute of l.atin American Studies: London. 1996. Pg. 13
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rebellion despite their geographical and linguistic differences.

TSOTSIL

LACANDON

TSELTAL

KANJOBAL
CHUJ
TOJOL-A'BAL
JACALTECO
CAKCHIQUEL
MOCHO

Carrasco. Tania. Davis, Shelton H. Valdes. Maria Eugenia. & Wodon. Quentin. Worldbank report: Indigenous
people in the state of Chiapas Guerrero and Oaxaca

Contrary to popular belief the revolutionary movement of Emiliano Zapata, which is
claimed by many indigenous people made no mention of them. The constitution ot 1917
similarly made no mention of the indigenous people of Mexico. The largest impact they felt as a
result of the revolution was the implementation of the Revolutionary labor law which affected
them as workers and peasants not as an ethnic group. It was only during the presidency ot
Lazaro C'ardenas that Indians were recognized as a group warranting special attention and the
department of Indian Affairs was founded. The nationalism and progressivism of Cardenas'
policies were felt immediately in Chiapas. The department of Indian Affairs organized a new

Page 14

TJ Koger

statewide union of Indian workers and assigned more ejidos^ or plots of land, to more villages
and communities than ever before.14 These reforms were the catalyst for the moderate economic.
social and development improvements since World War II as well as beginning of major changes
in the very way indigenous communities interacted with each other and the outside world.
One successful portion of the reforms taken by the INI was the advances in medical care
for the rural peasants, but the success was a double edged sword. The declining death rate and
infant mortality declined leading to a 50% increase in the villages by the mid-1960s. Resources
were scarce and growing population only served to put pressure on more and more people. More
and more, young Chapanecos began to look for a way of life outside of their community by
migrating to other regions, notably the Lacandon Jungle. The communities formed from these
emigrants would be formed in a new vein than both the traditional indigenous community and
15

the PRl influenced bossdoms due to different values and necessities.

The traditional indigenous communities were isolated entities organized primarily in
horizontal power structures by allowing the members with the most responsibilities the most
communal respect and power. These were “communities of reciprocal constraint and
,»16

satisfaction, annual dues and annual redemption.

Following the reforms of the INI in the

1950s there were pressures on the communities pushing them away from their traditional
community structure. The PRI were always looking for a way to better secure their political
power and the programs of the INl offered such an opportunity. The bilingual teachers sent to
indigenous communities under the guise of education and anti-poverty programs became
methods for PRl control. Similarly there were communities in the highlands’ northern and

Womack, pg. 8-9
Nicholas P. Higgins. Pg. 145
Womack, pg. 13
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eastern valleys which also abandoned the traditional structure, run instead by single members
rather than the assemblies and horizontal hierarchies. These communities formed differently,
breaking off from large commercial cattle ranches like those typically found in Guatemala,
forced to compromise and fight in the political system for their right to own land. For many who
did not own land but set out to do so the only method to acquire any was to become a member of
the PRI. Even if they did not become members of the PRJ they always, in the end, owed some
type of allegiance to the party thus maintaining the hegemonic power the PRI had installed in
17

Mexico.

These two types of communities, coupled with the extremely high growth rates led to the
creation of a third type of community bom of emigration. The young Chiapanecos migrating to
the canadas in the Lacandon Jungle found that the government was happy to supply ejidos to
virtually anyone who asked from them in the unexplored and barely inhabitable jungle. There
were settlements of all types, some mixed religion, some multilingual, some of only people from
the same neighborhood in their previous community. “The effect of the intermixing of
18

ethnicities and religions has been the creation of hybrid cultures that resist easy classification.
These new communities differed from the old types in that they did not have a singularly forceful
leader and the situation they found themselves in, one of mutual isolation and common concerns,
lent itself to a more egalitarian system of governance.

Or as Womack puts it “These were

«20

frontier democracies, improvised soviets.

"Womack. Pg. 15
Higgins Nicholas P. Understanding the Chiapas Rebellion. Pg. 145.
''' Womack pg. 1 18
Womack pg. U)
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It would be these communities that became the foundation of the EZLN through a
collective need for security.” The communities of the Lacandon would eventually face similar
problems of territorial disputes that the old communities had once faced forcing them to arm
themselves in order to protect their homes. More often than not the various divisions in the
indigenous communities have been overlooked throughout their history in deference to a
common cultural heritage as well as similar hardships as poor rural peasants.”^

Poverty and Development in the 1990s
The period in Mexico of over 400 years from the arrival of Cortez to the present has been
characterized by a system of profound subjugation which is directly responsible for much of the
poverty present in the indigenous communities today. Immediately following the Mexican
revolution the indigenous people as a whole were among some of the poorest on earth, extremely
uneducated, and largely suffering from malnourishment. They were landless with little to no
means of upward mobility. “In 1994 the indigenous population in Chiapas was around 650,000.
Over 40% aged 15 and older had no schooling, 56% of those 15 and older could not read or
write, probably two-thirds of the homes,crowded, dirt floor shacks, had no electricity, drinking
,23

water, or drainage, and almost 70% of working people made less than the minimum wage.’
Mexico’s recession in the 1980s, partly caused by the falling price of oil, coupled with
the ineptitude of the government following a major earthquake in 1985 inspired a desire for
change in many Mexicans. They did not see that change, however, as Carlos Salinas, elected
under suspicion of fraud, was sworn in as president. He continued the economic reforms of his
predecessor managing to curb inflation and renegotiate the Mexico’s large foreign debt. Mis
■' Womack pg. 20
“ Jorge Larrain. Pg. 33
Womack pg. 1 1
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economic initiatives, although mostly successful, were centered on privatization of state industry
and trade liberalization. These initiatives of industrialization and modernization were
implemented at the expense of the agriculture industry. Fully aware of the effects his economic
policies would have on the agricultural sector and the people who worked in it Salinas’ most
ambitious and well funded project became an anti-poverty program entitled “PRONASOL”,or
Solidarity. The main purpose of Solidarity was the realization by Salinas that if Mexico was
going to open its doors to more foreign trade and investment its government must have more
legitimacy with its people, especially the poor. He knew that the real support of the poor would
not increase by any action on the government’s part but rather the extent to which the
government empowered the poor to act for themselves.”"^
The task of empowering the indigenous people and more broadly, the poor in general,
became a difficult task in 1989 after the world price of coffee collapsed. Farmers, indigenous or
otherwise, who had invested in coffee trees, lost 65 to 75 percent of their income. Ranching and
com production also took huge hits. The ranching industry suffered from cheap argentine beef
but mostly from the actions of the governor who put the jungle ranchers under quarantine in
order to help the state’s big ranchers compete with the cheaper imports. The third major industry
of Chiapas would also take a huge cut in profitability when later that year Mexico began to
discuss the terms of NAFTA. Under the treaty Mexico would end price supports on com
effectively opening up the trade of com between the US and Mexico. In Mexico com sold for
25

US $240 a ton while com from Iowa was US $110 a ton.

The losses in these three industries

meant the collapse of three of the biggest sources of income for Chiapas and for agriculturally

Womack pg. 209; Monica Serrano and Victor Bulmcr-Thomas. Pg. 130-156
Womack pg. 21-22
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oriented indigenous communities. The poverty levels skyrocketed and the Mexican Government
26

was blamed."

“From 1989 to 1994 Solidarity projects numbered nationally almost 525,000, providing,
for a few examples, potable water to 13,500,000 people who did not have it before, electricity to
more than 20 million, 12,000 miles of roads in impoverished rural districts, and local
improvements in agriculture, livestock, small industry, and transport to nearly 6,400 Indian
,,27

communities, more than 2 million Indian people,

By 1993 social spending had grown from 32

percent of the national budget when Salinas took office to 52 percent, and to 55 percent in 1994.
From the program’s inception it was carefully regulated by Salinas to avoid corruption and
interference from the traditional PRI bosses. It was not the case that Solidarity was able to
totally avoid stiff resistance to many of its programs, especially in Chiapas. Many governors
used the money designated for Solidarity in projects they had a stake in or to benefit favored
municipal leaders. In 1992 the governor of Chiapas Patrocinio Gonzalez attempted to take total
control of the Solidarity programs by arresting the head INI officials and replacing them with his
own men. Salinas and his right hand man Colosio both visited Chiapas in 1993 in order to undo
some of the damage done by Gonzalez and the decrease in funds available to Indian
communities. Salinas pledged 50 million to the area, especially las cafiadas but it only created
more incentive for the EZLN to rebel. It was around this time that Subcomandante Marcos was
28

able to consolidate his power in the EZLN and lead them on a path to rebellion.
The actions of Gonzalez in 1992 set in motion a power struggle within the EZLN. As
conditions in Chiapas worsened the EZLN grew stronger as more and more indigenous people

Serrano and Bulmcr-Thomas. Pg. 113
Womack pg. 210
Milt Shapiro. Committee of Indigenous Solidarity - Washington DC(CIS-DC). 2000. Pg. 8-11
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were convinced to join the cause. The goal of the EZLN was not just a rebellion in Chiapas but a
national rebellion with several armies all across the country rebelling as one. But the events in
Chiapas were moving far more rapidly than the rest of the country leaving the leadership of the
EZLN to a decision. Of all things the impetus to act was caused by a social program. The extra
50 million pledged by Salinas instantly made large strides in alleviating the poverty of the area
but at the same time it consolidated Marcos’ position that rebellion could not wait as many
recruits were lured away by grants for new plots of land. Marcos set things in motion for a
rebellion to coincide with the announcement of NAFTA. If it had not been for the work of
Salinas, most importantly the hope of a renewed solidarity program in the Lacandon, the
rebellion would have been much larger than it actually was.“^ By resisting the successes of
Solidarity Marcos showed clearly, from the beginning, that in his eyes it was more than a
struggle for indigenous rights.
In 1992 the indigenous communities involved in the EZLN informed Marcos that they
were ready for the Rebellion. But, in 1992 the EZLN was not run by the CCRl(Indigenous
Clandestine Revolutionary Committee)instead run by the vertical hierarchy of the FLN (Fuerzas
de Liberacion Nacional) and Secretary General German. Marcos found himself at the crossroads
between the traditional leadership and founders of the FLN and the Indigenous communities
represented by elected delegates on the CCRI. 1992 the situation in Chiapas was becoming more
and more volatile. The actions of Governor Gonzalez exacerbated already poor conditions which
led to a swelling of the ranks of the FLN. The FLN was faced with a decision either to go to war
now in Chiapas or to wait until the its other branches were in place to ensure a wider national
rebellion.

Womack. Pg. 21.^
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Gennan eventually agreed with Marcos that war was a necessary action sooner rather
than later which was the moment Marcos consolidated an increasing amount of power within the
indigenous communities as their spokesman. Not all in the FLN command felt that going to war
was the proper course of action at the time. Rodrigo, German’s second in command felt that if
the forces in Chiapas were to rebel without simultaneous uprising in other states the full force of
the Mexican military would destroy them. Marcos countered by saying their forces were only
getting weaker by the day due to successes by both the church and its doctrine against violent
resistance and also the anti-poverty initiatives of the Government. After’s German’s decision
Rodrigo left in anger leaving German as the sole remaining member of the original members
following its inception in the mid 1970s. Perhaps acknowledging that fact German decided to
formally recognize the CCRl as a decision making body and the FLN became the EZLN. The
CCRl changed its basic structure from a top down militaristic approach to a community based
30

bottom up approach.

Shapiro, Milt. Committee of Indigenous Solidarity. The Origins of the Zapatista National Liberation Army. 2000.
Womack..lohn Jr. Rebellion in Chiapas. University of Texas Press; Austin. 1999. Pg. 190-192. Hodges. Donald
C. Mexican Anarchism After the Revolution. University of Texas Press; Austin. 1995. Pg. 196-197.
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Chapter 2: The Events ofthe Chiapas Rebellion
It began as a declaration, the first of many to come, which put in words the meaning of
the rebellion and its ultimate goals. The single most important unifying aspect of all of the
declarations is their intent to correct the wrongs committed by the national government in
Chiapas, and Mexico as a whole. Despite that unifying element the Declarations changed and
evolved with the situation to reflect the flexibility in the approach to reach that common end.
There is a clear progression in the Declarations(with the exception of the last one) leading away
from broader ideological goals toward more concrete local goals for autonomy. The initial
Declaration was a call for national revolution which was not met with the national support
sufficient enough, or at least of the expected type, to accomplish such a lofty goal. Instead there
was a call for peace and the EZLN was forced to verbalize its demands to the government it was
currently trying to overthrow. It was in these demands that the EZLN narrowed itself to be more
in line with its core following of indigenous soldiers, and introduced the idea of an indigenous
struggle and autonomy.
After the assassination of Colosio the EZLN saw a way to accomplish its original goals
of national revolution and put their demands, and their indigenous roots on hold, to pursue the
popular overthrow of the government. This time the EZLN had identified the group that would
help them in this endeavor as “civil society” or the same people who had risen up on their behalf
for peace. “Civil society” was not willing to overthrow the government, however, and the
National Democratic Convention, the body responsible for organizing “civil society” failed.
Following this setback the EZLN began to focus more on the issue of autonomy and the
creation of the communities in the following declarations. They continued along this path until
the failure of the San Andres Accords, otherwise known as the COCOPA legislation in congress.
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ended this trend of the declarations. In the Sixth Declaration the EZLN put an end to dialogue
and negotiations as a protest against the failure of the Accords with plans to resume negotiations
only after they were approved.
The flexibility was due, in part, to the dichotomous nature ofthe EZLN itself,
representing both a larger, national fight, and a smaller, local one. That inherent dichotomy
would be the source of two recurring, although rarely simultaneous, themes in the Declarations:
“civil society” and autonomy. “Civil society”, present early in the life of the EZLN and perhaps
reflective of that youthful zeal of the rebellion, was an attempt to overthrow the hegemonic
Party-State system present in Mexico presenting democracy as the answer to the problems in
Chiapas. This did not occur, causing the EZLN to refocus on smaller, local issues introducing
the idea of autonomy for indigenous communities to allow them to follow their own path of
development. The idea of autonomy is still alive in Chiapas today but any discussion must be
based upon an understanding of the evolution of the EZLN,their demands, and what shaped
those demands.

The Rebellion"
The Chiapas rebellion began on January L* 1994. In the morning rebel soliders wearing
ski masks moved into four municipalities in Chiapas Mexico. Marcos, a leader in the anny, was
at San Cristobal organizing troops through a radio and speaking to the crowd. It was in the
central Plaza that the First Declaration of the Lacandon was posted and read. It was also sent to
all of the major newspapers; the revolution had begun. Over the next couple of days the military
staged a large offensive using 15,000 troops, artillery and helicopter gunships. After only a few

".Sourcemex 1994-01-12. Summary of Event.s Surrounding the Chiapas Rebellion; Sourccniex. 1994-01-19.
Summary of Latest Development in Chiapas Conflict; Mihalis Mentinis. Zapatistas. Pluto Press: London. 200b. Pg.
8
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days of fighting the rebels had completely withdrawn back into the forest to take up defensive
positions. There were roughly 300 casualties, mostly from the EZLN,resulting from the
encounters between the two armies. The conflict was already receiving widespread international
and domestic attention and there was intense pressure on the Mexican government to cease its
offensive and enter peace talks. The EZLN in danger of being annihilated was also happy to
comply. The first round of negotiations between the two sides followed only twelve days of
actual fighting.

The First Declaration
The First Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle was first and foremost a declaration of
,,32

war. In the very first line of the declaration,“we are a product of 500 years of struggle

,the

EZLN identifies itself as the oppressed and their oppressor is the Mexican Government. The
declaration, as its central tenant, quotes Article 39 of the constitution as the justification of their
struggle against further oppression. It states:
“National sovereignty resides essentially and originally in the people. All public power
emanates from the people and is instituted for the people’s benefit. The people have, at
„33
all times, the unalienable right to alter or modify the form of their government.
By explicitly invoking Article 39 they accomplished several things which set them apart
from most other revolutions, created extensive media coverage and developed an almost iconic
status among foreign revolutionaries and revolutionary tourists. They gained international
recognition, legitimacy, and national support at the veiy beginning. The most interesting aspect
of the First Declaration, however, was not the content but the omissions. First, there was no
reference of any fonn of overarching ideology to support their actions. There was no mention of

'' KZLN First Declaration
'' FZLN First Declaration.
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communism despite Marcos’ proclivities for it, instead using the Mexican constitution to explain
34

and to justify their rebellion.

Also omitted was any mention of indigenous people or an

indigenous struggle. The First Declaration, by design, was an attempt to overthrow the current
president and was an attack on him and the Mexican Army which supported him. It was through
those means that the EZLN planned to overcome the oppression and with a legitimate democracy
the poor in Mexico would receive the care they deserved.

The Peace Talks
The first order set forth by the General Command of the EZLN in the First Declaration
was to “advance to the capital of the country, overcoming the Mexican federal anny, protecting
in our advance the civilian population and permitting the people in the liberated area the right to
„35

freely and democratically elect their own administrative authorities,

The EZLN consisted of a

small moderately trained military force which was clearly not large enough or powerful enough
to conquer the Mexican Military. The leadership was aware of this fact and instead focused their
plan on the upheaval their declaration would cause, leading to a civil revolt of the Mexican
people. The EZLN would then lead the Mexican people in the creation of a free and democratic
government. This did not occur. The outspokenness of the people to promote peace would be
influential in the emergence of“civil society” as a central idea in the Zapatista’s ideologies.
After twelve days of fighting a cease fire was declared and an end an agreement to meet to
discuss a peaceful resolution was struck.

John Womack Jr. Rebellion in Chiapas: an historical reader. New York: The New Press. 1999. Pg. 24.">
EZLN First Declaration.
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In the First Declaration the EZLN is identified as “our fighting arm of our liberation
struggle”^^ but does not present any other arms ofthe “liberation struggle” leaving the
impression that the EZLN was the only operating unit of the rebellion. The peace talks forced
the EZLN to take on the role as the negotiating peace keeping arm of the rebellion and the
transformation was required in a very short amount of time. The transformation from a military
force, the definition of the EZLN,to a political force was not a smooth transition. The EZLN, as
a basic tenant, was fighting for the destruction of the executive branch, but in order to find a
peaceful solution they would have to negotiate with the same president they were trying to
overthrow.
In the week of talks that followed the Zapatista delegates formulated thirty four
37

demands.

The demands set forth by the EZLN opened with a list of problems that they

identified as the principal cause of the uprising. The problems are a list of the inequalities and
injustices faced by the indigenous people and the ineptitude, whether purposefully or not, of the
Government to remedy these problems. They were mostly broad and overarching such as the
reetification of a lack of available land, poor access to education, and poor health care.
These demands were merely a representation of what the EZLN had hoped to accomplish
with a national revolution. They gave very specific criteria for correcting some of the principle
causes of the revolution. Also notable, they strongly incorporated previously unmentioned
elements of indigenous people and the state of Chiapas.^^ The idea for indigenous autonomy

was

introduced for the first time through four of the thirty four demands and would, as the rebellion
progressed become more central to the goals of the EZLN.^*^ The lead negotiator, Manuel

EZLN First Declaration
John Womack Jr. Rebellion in Chiapas: An Historical Reader. Pg. 268
Womack. Pg. 268
Womack,John Jr. Pg. 268
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Camacho, made commitments to resolve each demand with the exception ofthe first two which
included new elections and the resignation of the president. The government and the rebels
seemed to be heading toward an agreement, but the assassination of the president-to-be Luis
40

Donaldo Colosio led to the rejection of the demands by the EZLN.

Marcos would explain in an

interview three years later that the two events, Colosio’s assassination and the rejection of the
government’s demands, were connected. “The bullet that killed Colosio killed the possibility of
a peace accord with the EZLN. We can’t sign a pact with someone who isn’t even capable of
guaranteeing his heir’s life. Why would he guarantee his enemies?

Instead it seems the

EZLN believed that in the elections of 1994 the fraud would be so pronounced the populace
would raise itself in protest and the hegemonic rule of the PRI would come to an end.

The Second Declaration
Instead of agreeing to the resolutions of the 34 demands posed by the government the
EZLN chose instead to reevaluate the situation and their place in Mexico. The events following
the initial rebellion altered the original plans of the EZLN and were the impetus for the Second
Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, issued June

1994. The Second Declaration was issued

in anticipation of the upcoming presidential elections and presented a plan upon the continuation
of PRI hegemonic rule through electoral fraud. It is here in the second declaration that the
concept of“civil society” becomes the central theme of the EZLN. Civil society is defined as:
“the sphere of social life that is separate from the intimate bonds of family and
autonomous from regulation and scrutiny of the state. It generally refers to the social
interactions between individuals as free makers of contracts acting with rational selfinterest in a society where all have equal legal status. The concept of civil society also
implies limits on the state's role in regulating social life and a generalized responsibility

40

Womack,John Jr. Pg. 26‘J
Marcos in an Interview with Yvon lx Bol
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of individuals to act with due regard to the interests and collective life ofthe
,-42
community.
Essentially “the State,” or the government in all its branches represented “political
society” while “civil society” was the total combination of private or autonomous institutions
43

and voluntary associations of all classes in society.

In this specific case civil society refers to

the Mexican populace who rose up in protest of violence following the uprising and who
presumably would rise up again against election fraud.
The Second Declaration was a divided into two parts. The first part was a call to “civil
society”, as opposed to the call to the judicial and legislative branches in the first declaration, to
overthrow the President of Mexico. The second part sets up a national democratic convention to
provide a framework to insure the overthrow of the government resulted in a legitimate
democracy. In the interview with Yvon Le Bot Marcos explains the reasoning behind the
Second Declaration,“We thought the PRl was going to win, but by a fraud so enormous that
people would revolt. Tm not talking about taking up anns, but about a great protest movement.
We told ourselves that we had to wait for the elections and that people would realize that the
PRI, the State-party system, wasn’t going to commit suicide. That was what we demanded of it.
y44

sure, that it commit suicide, but that’s impossible.’

The elections, the cleanest by far of any

elections ever held in Mexico, was not sufficient to cause an uprising by “civil society” and the
45

National Democratic convention languished and faded into irrelevance.

■ Dictionary of .sociology online, http://bitbucket.icaap.org/
Mihalis Mentinis. Zapatistas: The Chiapas Revolt and What it Means for Radical Politics. London: Pluto Press,
2006. Pg. ^2-^5
44
Womack, pg .'^22
Womack. Pg. 288-290
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The Third Declaration
The EZLN’s decision to wait for the elections had not gone as planned and they were
forced to reevaluate themselves yet again. On the national scene the EZLN was forced to wait
for the inauguration of President Zedillo and to react to the political actions he took. During that
time, however, the EZLN was able to focus on Chiapas’ elections which had also been subject to
electoral fraud. The PRl candidate, Eduardo Robledo, defeated the PRD candidate Amado
Avendaho. The State Democratic Assembly led by the EZLN and formed from a coalition of
nearly 180 organizations formed Chiapas’s version ofthe National Democratic Convention, the
organizer of “civil society”. During the campaign to overthrow Robledo in Chiapas the
Zapatistas found another opportunity for the strategy of the Second Declaration to work on the
national level. The assassination of Ruiz Massieu, the PRI’s national secretary general and
Salinas’ last political ally and protection against the traditional bosses, opened the door once
again for the National Democratic Convention. The EZLN would use the situation in Chiapas to
provide an example for the entire country to follow. On October S**’ the CCRI-EZLN marched
25,000 into San Cristobal, disavowed the federal and state governments and announced a “civil
46

insurgency” for Avendano.
The insurgency established a transitional government in nine “autonomous multi-ethnic”
47

districts, the first appearance of the autonomous regions.

These autonomous regions would be

the foundation of the autonomy argument in the future but at the time they were primarily meant
to be the headquarters for the transitional government. The Autonomous communities would
play a large role in the future arguments about the sustainability of indigenous communities

Womack. Pg. 287-288
Womack. Pg. 289
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operating apart from the national government. Their successes showed autonomy could be
enacted legally and would succeed at the community level at the very least.
One of Zedillo’s first acts in office was to diffuse the Robledo situation in Chiapas.
Instead of acting militarily and quelling the demonstrations Zedillo’s minister of the interior
agreed to a deal with Avendaho to rule alongside Robledo in a parallel government of the
48

autonomous multi-ethnic communities.

The autonomous regions were legitimized, but the

struggle on how they would be defined began. Marcos states in the Third Declaration of the
Lacandon Jungle “Autonomy is not separation. It is the integration of the most humiliated and
1^9

forgotten minorities in contemporary Mexico ...

The EZLN was able to break through the

siege of the army and set up military positions in 38 municipalities.^® Through the actions of
Zedillo the autonomous communities became a permanent element in the rebellion and would
represent a new solution in the peace process. The additional struggle of how to define the
autonomous communities would later become the central element of the peace process.
Zedillo, much like Salinas, was not allied with the traditional bosses of the PRI, but
unlike Salinas he did not have the legitimacy to oppose them. The actions of the EZLN only
heightened Zedillo’s tenuous hold on the presidency and forced him to find some way to appease
the traditional base of the party. Zedillo began to use the military to regain some political capital
by operating against the rebels in the name of security. The military operation, despite being
successful in capturing all of the EZLN’s strongholds, was a political nightmare, especially
internationally, and Zedillo desperately attempted to restart the peace talks. The EZLN were on

John Ross, riie War Against Oblivion. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2000. Pg. I l l
Fhird Declaration
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John Ross. The War Against Oblivion. Pg. 94-95. Womack, pg. 290
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the verge of extermination but international attention and “civil society” came to its aid again.
51

The losses turned the EZLN into martyrs and turned Marcos, into a pop icon.
All of a sudden tlie EZLN found it had two separate agendas to accomplish: its original
struggle to overthrow the government and set up a transitional government through the National
Democratic Convention or, as a new alternative, the proper creation and rights for the
autonomous communities. The EZLN,riding high with international support and a national
backlash against the atrocities, decided to organize “civil society”, their continual protector, for a
second attempt to overthrow Zedillo’s government. They had misjudged once again as the
Zedillo government had solidified itself enough with the previous successful military operations
to avoid a popular insurrection. So instead, the EZLN chose to enter peace talks with the
Zedillo. Womack attaches the newfound tractability to other sources rather than any expected
agreement between the parties.
“It was simply a congruence of new calculations in the struggle for public support. In
anticipation of the EZLN’s metamorphosis into a mere left-wing political organization,
Zedillo and his ministers would use “dialogue” and official powers to prove their
sensitive, responsible, effective commitment to reform, and make nonviolent Zapatismo
irrelevant. In anticipation with the regime’s collapse, the CCRJ-EZLN high command
would use “dialogue” to demonstrate the government’s and the PRD’s incapacity for
reform, captivate “civil society,” and build the new popular force to replace its armed
.S2
force on the imminent day of redemption.”.
They subsequently began talks on the issue of Indigenous rights and culture, one of the five
topics to be discussed in the peace talks, using the formula set out by the Zapatistas of dialogue
then negotiation then accord and finally commitment.

' Womack, pg 295
Womack. Pg. 298
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The Fourth Declaration
On New Year’s Day 1996, the second anniversary of the rebellion, the CCRI-EZLN
issued the Fourth Declaration of the Selva Lacandon, officially forming the Frente Zapatista de
Liberacion Nacional, the FZLN. The FZLN was essentially a group that would house and
53

organize civil society in the fight for democratic elections and justice in Mexico,

It was

different from the EZLN in that it was non-violent and a direct organizer for “civil society”, not
just an ally of it. The reemergence of“civil society” as a central concept in the fourth
declaration was more a product of the compartmentalization ofthe EZLN’s goals than any
introduction of new ideas. The EZLN created a new arm in the struggle, a socio-political arm, in
order to allow the EZLN the freedom to pursue its military goals. As far as advancing towards
an overarching goal the Fourth Declaration did very little, as the newly created FZLN was never
given much importance. It did not even warranting a chief operator until nearly six months
later.54
Moving on independent of the fourth declaration the peace negotiations continued to
make progress. The initial topic, on the political social economic and cultural rights of the
indigenous in Mexico, brought to the forefront the idea of indigenous autonomy. The creation of
autonomous regions had already taken place on October 12**^, 1994, during the struggle against
Robledo, the PRlista governor of Chiapas. The framework for autonomy the EZLN (and also the
PRD)adopted was the plan put together in the summer of 1995 by the National Multi-Indigenous
Assembly. During the dialogue phase of the negotiations each side was permitted to bring
advisors to help wade through the invariably complications dealing with such a topic as broad

Fourth Declaration
Womack. Pg. 327
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and qualitative as indigenous rights."^ The government’s advisors tended to be from the
government run Nacional Indigenous Institute {bistituto Nacional Indigenista) while the
Zapatista’s advisors numbered over a hundred and comprised ofthe leading experts in the history
as well as the law in the areas of nationality, ethnicity, and autonomy. They quickly won over
the government’s advisors and by the end of the talks the government felt that both parties would
find the solution they were looking for in autonomy. On February 16‘*’, 1996, the accords on
Indigenous rights and culture were signed by the EZLN to finalize them into commitments but
they attached an addendum of demands not met by the government which the EZLN would
continue to struggle for.'^ On March IS'*’ President Zedillo sent the accord to congress only to
end in failure. This temiinated the remainder of the peace talks and forced the EZLN to
reevaluate their goals and how they would achieve them.

The Fifth Declaration
Following the failure of the accords in congress the EZLN severed all ties with the
executive branch and would not communicate with the Government until the San Andres
57

Accords were signed into law.

The silence was broken with the issuance of the Fifth

Declaration of the Selva Lacandon over two years later on July 19'*’, 1998. Unlike the other
declarations which list many demands this Declaration is much simpler and demands only one
thing. It demands that Article 4 of the Constitution be amended to include a statement in which
“the rights of Indians be recognized that assures them all respect and the possibility of struggling
for what belongs to them: land, housing, work, food, health care, education, democracy,justice.

' International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs and Aracely Burgucte Cal y Mayor. Eks-skoicns Trykkeri
aps; Copenhagen, Denmark. 2000. Pg. 24-29.
*>6
Womack. Pg. 307-308
Mihalis Mentinis. Zapatistas: The Chiapas Revolt and What it Means for Radical Politics. Pg. 18
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«58

liberty, national independence, and a worthy peace...

The demand is basically a refocusing

on by the EZLN on the passage of the San Andres accords as their primary goal. Their lone
proposal in the document is the creation of a second National Poll to be used as a referendum for
the “COCOPA (Comision de Concordia y Pacificacion) Indian bill” and use the Mexican people
59

to put pressure on congress to pass them.
Vicente Fox was elected in July, 2000 ending over 70 years ofPRI rule. During the
campaign he had promised to end tlie situation in Chiapas “in 15 minutes” and in December
Marcos sent the President a letter stipulating the requirements to resume negotiations. They
were:(1) The fulfillment of the San Andres Accords and translation into law of the COCOPA
proposal,(2) the release of all Zapatista prisoners in Chiapas and elsewhere, and (3)the
demilitarization of Chiapas.^® The CCRI-EZLN decided to send a delegation to Mexico City to
speak in congress on the importance of the “ley COCOPA”. The march to Mexico City lasted
fifteen days and it gave the EZLN time to change its discourse from defining the enemy as PRI
hegemonic rule to the system that had marginalized them. The loss of the PRI was, in a way, a
blow to the relevance of the EZLN as a radical political-military force and, with the exception of
the law on Indian rights and culture and the autonomous communities, the EZLN was not able to
muster much support opposing the new government. On April 25 the legislators revised the
constitution, but only after significantly modifying the initial proposal. In what was already a
marginal victoi-y in the eyes of the EZLN the revisions had turned into a defeat as the indigenous
61

communities were denied the rights that they felt made them autonomous.

Marcos and the

general command of the EZLN send a communique to the press shortly after in which they

Fifth Declaration
Fifth Declaration
H\

Mihalis Mentini.s. Pg. 26
Womack. Pg. 59
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rejected to revisions and entered into a period of prolonged silence presumably to reevaluate
their goals and explore new paths to accomplish them.

The Sixth Declaration
The sixth and most recent declaration was issued in June 2005, over four years since their
last communication with the Mexican Government in April 2001. The declaration gives a brief
history of the struggle so far and its actions following the cessation of dialogue and negotiations.
The EZLN decided to enact the San Andres Accords unilaterally and have since been tending to
and encouraging the growth of independent political systems in the indigenous communities. In
August 2003 the EZLN supported the formation of Good Government Juntas (Juntas de Bien
Gobiemo) to govern the communities because they felt that their rule, a military rule, went
against what they were trying to fight. Since then, the EZLN claims that the only growth in
indigenous communities was found in Zapatista run indigenous communities based on
62

government figures.
The true purpose, which is in stark contrast to the most recent declarations, is an
extremely broad and very ideological attack on capitalism, its destructive factors, and a call to
63

arms to prevent its spread and the spread of neo-liberalism (global capitalism) in Mexico,

The

break from this charge to claim a new struggle against the forces of capitalism and neo
liberalism highlight the disconnect between the leaders in the EZLN,the indigenous they
represent, and the Mexican people. The struggle of autonomy has been left to the communities
themselves and the organization itself, led by the ideologies of Marcos, has come full circle in
the demand for national revolution.

CCRI-EZLN. "Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle." InMotion Magazine: 18 Aug 2005.
Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle.
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Chapter 3: The Policy ofAutonomy
“Autonomy is a device to allow ethnic or other groups claiming a distinct identity to
exercise direct control over affairs of special concern to them, while allowing the larger entity
„64

those powers which cover common interests.

While this definition touches on the core of

what autonomy is it does not begin to encompass tlie complexity of it. The word autonomy can
refer to both the individual and the collective. Autonomy of the individual refers to the
fundamental freedoms of that person with respect to other people. Similarly, collective
autonomy refers to the freedoms and rights of a particular group with respect to other, distinct
groups. The situation in Chiapas, along with all discussions on indigenous rights, deals with
collective autonomy and the difficulties involved with it.
Autonomy is one element in the broader ethnic minority policy of accommodation. In
any struggle between competing groups there are three broad positions that each side, whether
dominant or subordinate, can take. Accommodation is seen as the middle ground between
secession and assimilation. In the discussion on Chiapas as well as other indigenous conflicts it
is important to understand the differences between these three distinct paths and the implications
each has on the indigenous communities and the nation.
“Autonomy” derives from Greek roots autos (“self’) and nomos (“law”), implying that
those seeking it want more local control but do not want to leave the current political community
altogether. “Secession,” on the other hand refers to the removal of a group of people from a
certain temtory, or out of the political community either to join another, often ethnically similar

^ Yash Ghui. Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-cthnic States. Cambridge;
Cambridge University Press. 2000. Pg. 8
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65

state or to become independent on their own.

Throughout much of its history, and even to a

certain extent contemporary Mexico, the National Govermnent along with most citizens of
European descent has operated under a policy of separation through segregation. A separation
policy focuses on the differences between the groups and what sets them apart. Without any
available means to remove themselves from positions of subordination the discriminated group
will either evade the persecution by emigrating or endure it in hopes of waiting for someone
66

powerful enough to rescue tliem or at the very least to not make it worse.
If secession is on one end of the spectrum the other end would be assimilation.
Assimilation can come in many forms and each looks very different when viewed from either a
dominant viewpoint or a subordinate viewpoint. If taken from the dominant perspective the two
extremes become “ethnocide”, or the purposeful destruction of a group’s culture, to basic
programs aimed at helping new immigrants adapt to another country. Within these poles there
exist several policies that the dominant group can take. Firstly, the assimilation can be planned
or unplanned. In general planned assimilation is more aggressive but unplanned assimilation
such as economic development can have just as drastic of consequences. Unexpected economic
shifts and changes in the disparity between groups can spark militaiy conflict for example
NAFTA and the EZLN’s fear of its effects. Planned assimilations can be either limited creating
a type of tokenism in lower positions in government or aggressive and collective assimilation.
The people who choose to assimilate on a limited or individual level often find the most strife
with the militant factors of their abandoned ethnicity while collective assimilation, seen as the
opposite of segregation, has broader effects and can become a type of cultural genocide

rcrrcnce B Cook. Separation, Assimilation, or Accommodation: Contrasting Ethnic Minority Policies. Westport,
CT: Pracger Publishers, 2003. Pg. 36-37.
frf>
Cook. Pg. 14-16
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completely erasing all that makes them different. From the subordinate side, the assimilations
strategy is seen as a way to integrate in order to achieve economic and social equality. The most
basic level is personal assimilation or when individuals choose to adopt the culture of the
dominant group. This is most common when the individual is away from the geographical
concentration of his ethnic group.
Paired Ethnic Minority Policy Choices and Possible Consequences
Choice by
Subordinate

Separation

Choice by Dominant

Separation

Assimilation

Accommodation

If their labor is not

If the weak want to remain

Here the strong may be

needed, emigration by

apart or secede, they may

making concessions to

the weak is no problem.

punish their own members
who succumb to assimilation

preserve the communitywhile the weak arc

by the dominant.

attempting to secede

The dominants may have

Although the dominants select

no interest in negotiating
a “social contract" with

some subordinates they

Concurrence here may be
difficult because the

the weaker ethnieity,
who want one.

may even try to erase the
cultural difference.

But if they attempt
secession, the dominant
group may repress it
Acconi modation

aceord no real equality. They

dominants usually make
minimal concessions, the
dominated look for
ma.ximal.

Assimilation

Here the weak may be
frustrated in their

When the dominant assimilate

The strong may here
accord to subordinates

ambition to compete for

select individuals, they
weaken the subordinate

jobs and other benefits,

group, without giving the

merely formal equality of

facing either thorough

latter desired equality. They
could even aim at an

opportunity to those

segregation or at least
glass ceilings

aggressive assimilation or
ethnocide.

minimal rights, even

meeting certain
assimilations.

Soukc: Figure 5.1 Cook. Pg. 107

The struggle for any single policy is not free from influences of outside circumstances.
and is normally predicated by the action of an opposing group. For example, perceived
aggressive assimilation, economic or otherwise, on the part of the dominant ethnicity can result
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in a separatist reaction from a minority group. The indigenous people in Chiapas imited by the
threat of NAFTA were able to shift from no ethnic policy (individuals and small groups took on
various forms of submissive assimilation to non-secessionist separation) to a policy ofstaunch
accommodation or separation. If cultural survival is deemed important enough; even to the point
that an unplanned assimilation, such as gradual economic development of a heretofore backward
region, it can awaken cultural anxieties, especially in a linguistic or religious minority growing
67

fearful of lost identity.
Autonomy has become the middle solution between separation and assimilation.
“From a comparative and historical perspective, demands for some form ofautonomy
generally come from subordinate groups involved in asymmetrical power structures and
who, for some reason or other, have been excluded or marginalized from decision
making processes and from full participation in the political and economic activity of
society (or of the nation, as appropriate), inside state and dominant structure where they
«68
occupy subaltern positions.
These marginalized groups do not necessarily refer to numerical inferiority but to a general
political, cultural and economic subordination. This subordination is characteristic of indigenous
69

peoples even when they do not form a demographic minority,

In fact, ethnicity, whether

categorized as an indigenous people or not, is the most common form of organization in nations
70

often forming the basis for other larger divisions including political parties and social classes.
A marked shift, for whatever reason, in the ethnic policy of one group will usually cause a shift
in the policy of the opposing group. Even if both the dominant ethnic group and subordinate

f.7

Cook. Pg. 39.
IWGIA and Aracely Burgucte Cal y Mayor. Indigenous Autonomy in Mexico. Eks-skolen trykkeri aps:
Copenhagen. 2000. Pg. 13
60
Cal y Mayor. Pg. 13
7(1
Handelman, Howard. The Challenge of Third World Development. Prentice Hall. 200.S. Pg. 47
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group support the same broad consensus on the course of action they may still be unable to reach
an agreement.
Before issues preventing autonomy can be explored it is essential to understand how each
group approaches the struggle for it. The chart below outlines how the Mexican government and
the EZLN approached autonomy, highlighting the consistency with other ethnic conflicts.
Chronological Summary of How the Government of Mexico and the EZLN Approached
Accommodations
EZLN

Government of Mexico

Initial Action/Reactimi

Due to the economic pressures of

The first declaration was an

NAR'A and the need to ensure

attempt to bring attention to the

security to attract investment they

disparity between the indigenous

Government chose not to oppress

communities and the rest of

the rebellion but to enter into

Mexico.

negotiations with them.
Initial Policy

The initial mindset is to make no

Once stimulated by initial gains

more than the minimal concessions,

the EZLN began to frame

but enough to put a stop to the

demands in terms of maximal

rebellion.

conce.ssions. The Militant
demonstrations were an attempt to
mobilize ‘civil society' and create
more pressure on the
Government.

Outcome of the Initial Policies

During the Negotiation process the

The EZLN during the negotiation

Government was able to use its

process entered in a subordinate

position of power to force the EZLN

position becau.se of the failure to

toward the middle ground and made

organize ‘civil society' and was

minimal concessions in education,

not able to apply any pressure to

resources, and political power.

the Mexican G(wcrnmcnt. By
moving to the middle ground first
they were able to claim the moral
high ground but it weakened their
position further and gained little
in the San Andres Accords

Readjustment t)f Initial Policy

By the time to ratily the San Andres

After the Accords were not

Accords the Government of Mexico

approved the EZLN decided to
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had consolidated its position since

break relations with the Mexican

the initial pressures of the beginning
of the rebellion and chose to not

Government and instead has been
acting independently to install its

pass the accords returning to a hard

initial plans for autonomous

line separatist position.

communities without any support
or interference from the
Government of Mexico

Source: Figure 6.1 Cook Pg. 134

Autonomy in Chiapas is an ongoing struggle with evolving setbacks and difficulties but
the basic outline of the major obstacles is clear. “The subject of autonomy for indigenous
peoples has to tackle at least four fundamental issues: firstly, the identity of the subjects of
autonomy; secondly, the scope and limits of autonomy; thirdly the responsibilities which will be
devolved to the autonomous entity and fourthly, the legal framework which will govern relations
„71

between the state and the autonomous units.

Before each issue can be solved there must be an

agreement on the previous issue upon which to stand and build upon. The identity of the
subjects of autonomy was explored in the first chapter. Although there is no set way to define
indigenous populations or individuals the presence of self-determination of an individual’s
indigenous heritage in the constitution has alleviated this problem on a political level.
The policies of the Government of Mexico and the indigenous groups, currently
represented by the EZLN, has evolved through the years until finally coming to rest at a mutual
accommodation policy for the San Andres Accords. The intersection of the accommodation
policies did not guarantee an agreement, instead “concurrence here may be difficult because the
dominants usually make minimal concessions, the dominated look for maximal” causing an
impure coordination problem in which both sides want an agreement and neither can agree on
the terms. Moving towards the middle becomes a strategic decision and as we will see not
optimal.
Cal y Mayor. Pg. 18
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When facing the issue of determining the scope and limits of autonomy in the Chiapas
situation much can be gained by observing it through the concepts of minimal accommodation
and maximal accommodation. The policy of accommodation can be further broken down into
four main fields: basic rights,justice in other policy, devolution of powers, and power sharing at
the center. Basic rights encompass mainly the rights involving the culture of a specific group
such as religion, language, and to a certain extent education. The other policy refers to the rights
that go beyond culture such as discrimination in the job market and affirmative action programs.
Devolution of powers refers to the political rights of a person and is best summarized as equality
before the law. The last field, power sharing at the center, is the right of each group to have
representation in the government of its nation.

Minimalist Perspective - Strategy of the Dominant Ethnic Group’^
Minimal accommodation, in its most basic form (excluding no accommodation at all
which is actually some fonn of separation or aggressive assimilation) is an offer not meant to be
kept by either not implementing it or revoking it at the earliest opportunity. This is exactly what
the Mexican government has done. The rejection of the San Andreas Accords by the Mexican
Congress is essentially a reneging of agreed upon parameters for autonomy. Unique to the
Chiapas situation, the rejection of The Accords, an obvious shift away from accommodation, has
allowed a defacto autonomy to develop. The demand for autonomy by the EZLN was an
overarching goal supported by many other demands. For example, a primary demand of the
EZLN is the protection of their indigenous language and religion through education. True to the
minimalist model the Mexican Government has not supported indigenous languages instead

- Cook. Chapter 5. Pg. 103-120.
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choosing to only fund schools which teach in Spanish. Generally, subordinate ethnic groups will
claim they do not receive equal treatment economically, socially, and even under the law. Equal
treatment is a common demand in ethnic conflicts and can be seen as the most prominent
rhetorical element used in the declarations. Affirmative action programs aimed at creating equal
treatment, if approved, would be very limited in scope in the minimalist approach often limiting
it to jobs of lower socioeconomic status or having a certain cutoff date for the project. The
Mexican Government did create programs to improve the standard of living for indigenous
communities but affinnative action programs designed to truly level the playing field were

never

73

implemented.

The third categoiy, devolution of powers, is the insistence of increased ‘home

rule’ by the subordinate minority group and the category where we find autonomy. The
additional powers are usually only granted to curtail secessionist leanings and once that is
averted no more powers are granted. The EZLN were careful in their rhetoric to never claim
independence from Mexico. Because this was the case the Government never felt threatened by
a secessionist movement and was able to focus more on appeasing demands to curtail the bad
publicity as opposed to devolving powers in order to not lose territory. The fourth and final
category is similar to the struggle for autonomy in that it involves political power. Power
sharing at the center, however, has a unique set of restrictions and demands when compared to
the devolution of local power. The most minimal manifestation of this is ‘tokenism’ when a few
seats in the legislature are reserved for an ethnic minority.

H.D. I’orbcs. Ethnic Conflict. Yale University Press: New Haven: 1997. Pg. 151
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Maximalist Perspective - Strategy of the Dominant Ethnic Group
The dominant ethnic group may recognize some basic functions of an indigenous
language but choose to limit its use to areas of high ethnic concentrations. The same type
allowances would follow with religion. This basic right is common in ethnic conflict as
language is one of the primary indicators of belonging to a particular group or culture. The field
of‘justice in other policies’ refers to the demand for legal equality of opportunity and its
enforcement. Often this is enough for highly educated ethnic minorities but, as we have seen
previously, ethnic minorities tend to be in conditions that are so unequal that they cannot
successfully compete. Affirmative action calls for special remedial programs aimed at removing
them from poverty because they are starting from a disadvantage and must benefit from special
allowances in order to stand as equals to the rest of the country in the future. The maximalist
approach takes the point that only compensatory measures can create equality between the
competing ethnicities due to the fact that the previous amangement legally favored the dominant
group putting the subordinates at a self perpetuating disadvantage. The maximalist power
sharing policy, at its center, promotes a proportional electoral system. “A recent pooled time
series analysis of cross-national data not surprisingly found that proportional representation
74

electoral system rather than plurality voting correlated with less ethnic violence.
Within the framework of a maximalist and a minimalist approach there are varying
degrees to the amount of compromise each side is willing to go. The can range from moderate,
meaning they are close to the middle of the spectrum and the willingness to compromise is much
greater, to militant, which is very unwilling to compromise. There are many factors that cause
the leader of a group to fall somewhere between moderate and militant whether it is personality.
Cook. Chapter 6 Pg. 121 * 1.13.
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general group pressures, or the system in which they find themselves. One factor in particular
that affects the chances of ethnic accommodation is the democratic tendencies of the ruling body
and the makeup of the groups tliat encompass that body. Until 2000, with the election of Vicente
Fox of the Partido de Accion Nacional (National Action Party), Mexico was governed by a
nondemocratic single party system. The PRl held hegemonic power over the national
government with presidents selecting their successor every six years. This type of regime type
coupled with the fact that the PRl received very little support from indigenous communities led
them to adopt a very unaccommodating position. After democratic elections the national
government has become considerably more accommodative especially since the PRD,the second
largest party in Mexico, has consolidated support from the indigenous population.
The negotiations between the EZLN and the Government under Vicente Fox ended in a
stalemate. The strategies of each, a minimalist approach and a maximalist approach, make it
extremely difficult to compromise. “As long as dominant ethnic groups are only willing to grant
minimalist concessions in accommodation and as long as weaker groups ask for maximalist
concessions, no meeting of minds seems imminent. Often there is a long history of gaming
between a dominant ethnic group and a weaker one, and part ofthe game may often be an
unwillingness of either side to move too fast toward the middle ground, which often but not
always is the moral high ground. Dominant ethnic groups fear loss of control if they are
generously accommodative, hence may use any available means to avoid that,

In game

theory, or the study of decision making, this inability to reach an agreement is called an impure
coordination problem. An impure coordination problem is where “eveiyone would like an

Cook.. Pg 120
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agreement, but find it hard to agree on its terms, or who gives what and who gets what,

The

decision to move to the middle ground, or in game theory terminology cooperation, is tempered
by the strategy to remain on one polar side, or to defect. The decision whether to cooperate or to
defect is called a Prisoner’s Dilemma problem or a PD game. In the classic PD game both sides
gain more if they both cooperate rather than if they both defect. Additionally if one cooperates
and one defects the defector will gain more than if he had cooperated. By this logic it will
always be a greater benefit to defect in the PD game. The classic PD game, however, is viewed
as a single shot game which is inconsistent with the multiple interactions present in real life.
Robert Axelrod in his work The Evolution ofCooperation examines the iterated (multi-game)
PD game. In the IPD game the equilibrium shifts from defection to cooperation. Axelrod
asserts: “What makes it possible for cooperation to emerge is the fact that the players might meet
again. This possibility means that the choices made today not only determine the outcome of this
move, but can also influence the later choices of the players. The future can therefore cast a
„77

shadow back upon the present and thereby affect the current strategic situation,

In

experiments using computer simulated personalities the optimal strategy became a TIT-FORTAT strategy or one that tried cooperation first and then would mimic the action of the opponent
in the following games. What occurred was that the simulations that cooperated continued to
play with other simulations that cooperated while the simulations that defected were collectively
avoided by all the simulations.
The theory behind the IPD game can be applied to the Chiapas rebellion and the failures
of its subsequent negotiations. The decision of the Government of Mexico to not ratify the San
Andres Accords is a clear-cut and obvious defection. The EZLN on the other hand chose the

^Teirence E Cook. pg. 179 figure 7.1 Type of Games or Problem Situations.
'Robert Axelrod. The Evolution ofCoofjeralion. Basic Bot>ks: New York. Pg. 12
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cooperation strategy, choosing to negotiate with the government, sign the accords, and even
make several large concessions. Due to the defection of the Government of Mexico both players
have essentially stopped playing the game with one another. Negotiations have ceased and the
two parties are stuck at a mutually detrimental equilibrium. This mutual defection has caused a
unique situation in Chiapas which operates a defacto autonomy with little to no national support
or interference.
Although the Constitution of Mexico was officially amended to include a section on
indigenous rights and culture its omissions reflect the power of the dominant group and the
inability of the EZLN to produce any kind of pressure. Ethnic conflict is essentially about the
78

control of a state or part of a state,

The National Government’s position of power allowed it to

maintain its control over the state and reduce the EZLN’s struggle into a form of accommodation
centered on minimalist concessions.

Forbes. Ethnic ConHict. Pg. 142.
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Conclusion
The definition of autonomy as a “device to allow ethnic or other groups claiming a
distinct identity to exercise direct control over affairs of special concern to them, while allowing
the larger entity those powers which cover common interests” leaves a large amount of flexibility
in what qualifies as a special concern and what are common interests/^ The process of
negotiation to decide autonomy’s form and limits is unique for each country and each struggle.
Each adds to the understanding of it as a tool to reach a solution — what is successful and what is
not. In Chiapas the rebellion a unique aspect which shed light on the role of violence in
indigenous struggles. The events following the Chiapas Rebellion show that violent actions have
little success negotiating the rights of autonomy but a great deal of success in creating the
political space to negotiate.
Of the three types of minority policies a government can adopt- separation,
accommodation, and assimilation - autonomy does not fall squarely into one category. Instead it
fluctuates between accommodation and separation depending on its structure. In its intended
form it is meant to incorporate a group into the political sphere of a nation all the while
maintaining a degree of separation to protect a different cultural heritage.

Autonomies arise in

situations of multi-ethnic states with large divisions between each group and in nations with two
ethnicities and smaller more reconcilable divisions. It can at times also be used to isolate and
control a group and when implemented acts as a barrier to integration rather than a catalyst for it.
There are many justifiable reasons why Indigenous populations should be granted
autonomy. First, in Latin America especially, indigenous groups are generally geographically
Yash Ghai. Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claim.s in Multi-Ethnic Statc.s. Pg. 8
Yash Ghai. Pg. 12
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concentrated which is a prerequisite for regional autonomy. While it is the case in Chiapas that
there are many ethnicities, their similarities are highlighted during their struggle for autonomy to
the point where they act as one group. Corporate autonomy, or autonomy based on cultural or
physical traits, is a much more difficult situation and it creates a myriad of additional problems.
Regional autonomy for indigenous groups is politically easier to justify because they have few
chances or incentives to participate in the national system. Their small size and distance from
urban centers beseeches a greater amount of local governance, perfectly satisfied by this type of
autonomy.
Regional autonomy is also ideal for protecting local culture and traditions. In Chiapas
prior to the rebellion there was an increase in the efforts of the national government to bring
services and technology to the indigenous communities. These efforts however saw little value
in maintaining the way of life of the communities, instead seeking to install a more modem and
mainstream culture and system. There were many benefits from this system such as improved
health care, communication, and transportation, but the losses to indigenous culture - the lack of
schooling in indigenous languages, the use of natural resources by the national government,
emphasis on manufacturing instead of agriculture - offset many of the advantages. More and
more national governments are realizing that it is in their best interests to maintain their cultural
81

diversity rather than stifle it with policies of assimilation.

There are many historical similarities between the indigenous groups of Chiapas Mexico
and the Indigenous groups throughout Latin America. These similarities are what allow the
comparisons between countries to be applicable. Colonial rule in Latin America created a

United Nations Permanent Forum of Indigenous Issues. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples. .September 2007.
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system to maintain the European descendant’s dominance first by force, then subjugation, then
separation. The institutionalized subjugation of the indigenous communities by the PRI
maintained the already rampant poverty and was the cause for widespread unrest and
discrimination. This same unrest and discrimination is found throughout Latin American
countries as the colonial system created similar systems of subjugation wherever it was
implemented.
The rebellion of the EZLN was a large factor in the struggle for indigenous rights and
autonomy. It explains many things about the nature of the relationship between autonomy and
violence. The failure of the EZLN to achieve the demands they sought is strong evidence to the
fact that violent struggles do not coincide with success in these areas. The military actions of the
EZLN were successful in other areas, however, such as gaining international attention for their
struggle, creating instability in a corrupt national government, and gaining domestic support for
their causes. The EZLN was incapable of abandoning its militaristic ways to become a non
violent political force because it had several priorities in addition to gaining autonomy for
indigenous people. When the EZLN rebelled in 1994 autonomy was a secondary priority to full
scale revolution. By dividing its efforts the EZLN stood little chance in gaining autonomy from
the government.
The success of any negotiation is based primarily on the amount of cooperation and
compromise. As is evident in the study of autonomy in Mexico the leadership of the government
or the competing group is an important indicator on the amount of cooperation between them.
The PAN’s victory of the presidency in 2000 signaled a new oppoitunity for renewed talks
between the EZLN and the national government. Despite the PAN’s conservative base President
Fox was very receptive of the EZLN, allowing them the chance to speak in front of Congress and
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persuade them to pass the COCOPA legislation. They were unsuccessful in their attempt and
congress failed the bill. Although it was later passed after heavy modifications there has been no
dialogue between the EZLN and the national government since the bill’s initial failure and it is
unlikely ever to be resumed. Recently the EZLN has faded in its relevance to Mexican politics
due to the enhanced democracy and accountability of the national government today. The EZLN
is unable to justify its existence as a revolutionary force in Mexico as easily as before due to the
fact that few Mexicans feel a revolution is needed anymore. Its successes in undermining the
hegemonic power of the PRI served to undo the EZLN as a relevant institution in mainstream
Mexico today.
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